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PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH AND TENURE: A TEST OF
OJT THEORIES OF WAGE AND PRODUCTIVITY GROWTH
1.0 Introduction
Studies have found consistently that there is a strong positive correla-
tion between a worker's tenure with a firm and that individual's wage rate.
Becker's (1975) on-the-job training (OJT) model is the most widely accepted
explanation for this association. The OJT model posits that new employees
receive training early in their tenure, which raises their productivity both
in and outside the firm. Competition forces the employer to pay employees who
have completed this training at least as much as they are worth outside the
firm less transfer costs. Jobs that offer such training are more attractive
than jobs that do not, so competition forces down the entry wage of jobs that
provide training below the entry wage of jobs that offer no training. During
the training period, the supervisors and other workers are spending time away
from other activities, helping the new employee learn the job. The new em-
ployee may also spend time in learning activities instead of production
activities. In order to offer training, the employer must be compensated for
the resulting sacrifice in current output. When the training provides general
skills, the only way such compensation can be provided is by a further lower-
ing of the entry wage. Thus, there are two forces that cause wage rates of
new employees to rise: the increase of the employee's productivity and the
decline of training expenses. When training is entirely specific, and there-
fore does not raise the worker's productivity in other firms, the forces
causing a rising wage profile are weaker. They do not disappear, however, for
a rising wage profile reduces the quit rate of trained workers, and thus pro-
tects the firm's investment in training.
Recently a number of papers have proposed alternate explanations of the
positive correlation between tenure and wage rates. Salop and Salop (1976)
have proposed that a rising wage profile may be a strategy for attracting
workers with low quit propensities to a firm. Jovanovic (1979) has developed
a job-matching theory of turnover which hypothesizes that workers remain in
jobs in which th~ir productivity is high and are fired (or quit) from jobs in
which their productivity is low. He concludes that "since wages always equal
expected marginal products for all workers, the model generates (an average)
wage growth as tenure increases." (p. 974) A rising wage profile has also
been shown to be a consequence of efforts to prevent shirking (Lazear 1981).
Lazear and Moore tested this model and concluded that "under some strong
assumptions, our conclusion. . . is that most of the slope of the age earn-
ings profile reflects incentive based wealth and not human capital accumula-
tion via on-the-job training." (Lazear and Moore 1981, p. 19)
The most persuasive attack on the dominance of the OJT explanationfor
wage growth comes from a'series of papers by Medoff (1977) and by Medoff and
Abraham (1980, 1981a, 1981b). Medoff and Abraham observed that "despite the
straightforward nature of the test required to establish empirically the
superiority of the human capital explanation of the experience-earnings pro-
file over alternative models, . . . no one has ever provided evidence which
demonstrates that experience-earnings differentials can in fact be explained
by experience-productivity differentials" (1981a, p. 187). Using microdata
from the personnel records of four large United States corporations, Medoff
and Abraham found that while within a grade level there is a positive
association between wage rate and experience, there is a negative association
between performance rating and experience. They concluded that "under the
assumption that rated performance is a valid indicator of relative produc-
tivity, our results imply that a substantial fraction of the return to
experience among the groups we are studying is unrelated to productivity"
(1981a, p. 187). Medoff and Abraham also reviewed a large number of other
studies and concluded that employees with less-than-average seniority who are
beyond the initial very short orientation/training period are normally
slightly more productive than workers with more than average senority (Medoff
and Abraham 1981a). Most of the studies reviewed were either of unionized
employees or of employees in large corporations.
Except for Medoff-Abraham, tests of Becker's OJT hypothesis have usually
estimated only the wage-tenure profiles with the presumption that added tenure
is a proxy for added OJT. Actually, there are several implicit subhypotheses
which also need to be examined:
1.
2.
3.
an increase in tenure leads to an increase in OJT;
an increase in OJT leads to an increase in productivity; and
an increase in productivity leads to an increase in wage rates.
Prior studies have lacked data to test these relationships, but this study is
significant in having a national sample of individual data on wage rates, re-
ported productivity, tenure, and time spent by peers and managers in training
an employee in the first month on the job. After the first month, we do not
have an explicit measure of OJT, but we do have measures of reported relative
productivity. These data and appropriately specified econometric models (that
correct for selection bias that may result from turnover) enable us to test
the latter two of the three subhypotheses listed above.
1.1 Data
This analysis will make use of a unique data set on 3,416 recently hired
employees in approximately as many different firms. Descriptive statistics
are presented in table 1. The data set is unique because it is based on
interviews conducted with the new worker's employer, and therefore contains
information on the firm, the job, and the employer's opinion of the employee.
Such data have not been available to previous studies of job turnover and wage
growth. The sample of recently hired workers was obtained by asking a stra-
tified random sample of employers to provide information on an unskilled or
semiskilled new hire who was hired between January 1, 1978 and October 1,
1979. (A description of the employer survey and its sampling frame are avail-
able upon request from the authors.) An unskilled or semiskilled worker was
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defined as a sales worker in the retail or service industries or a laborer,
service worker, operative, or clerical worker in any industry. The employer
was asked to select the most recently hired employee fitting this description
regardless of whether the individual was still with the firm. A series of
thirty-five questions was asked about this new employee. If the firm had
hired a worker for whom it received a subsidy from TJTC, WIN, or CETA-OJT in
the last two years, it was asked to answer a parallel set of questions about
this worker. 1 The sample we analyzed includes 391 workers subsidized by
CETA-oJT, 44 subsidized by TJTC, and 43 subsidized by WIN.
One of the more unique elements of this data set is its measurement of
the employer's opinion of the productivity of a recently hired new employee.
A productivity rating was assigned to each employee at two different points in
time by asking the employer or supervisor the following question, "If you
consider the productivity of an average-experienced worker in this job to be
50 on a scale from 1 to 100, what rating would you give NMtE for (his/her)
productivity during (his/her) second week of employment?"
Comparable productivity ratings for a period of six to twenty-four months
later were obtained for workers that remained with the firm by asking an iden-
tical question about current performance. A similar question was asked about
the productivity of the separating worker just prior to separation. Note that
all of these questions ask for a comparison between a particular worker and an
average-experienced worker. They are not attempting to measure productivity
in any absolute sense. They provide an ordinal indicator of the relative
productivity of different workers in the same job or of the same worker at
different points in time as perceived by the employer or supervisor.
1.2 Correcting for Selection Bias
In estimating a wage growth equation for workers in our. sample, we are
faced with a complex missing data problem. Since many of the workers for whom
we have data were no longer with the firm at the time of final contact (i.e.,
they had quit or were terminated), we do not observe wage growth for all
workers. If the worker's presence/absence is not the result of a random pro-
cess, the distribution of wage growth values becomes truncated (or censored).
If ordinary least squares is applied to the subsample of workers still at the
firm, parameter estimates will be conditional on the presence of the worker.
C~nsequently, estimates of the effects of changes in policy-related variables
on wage growth will be subject to a potentially serious selection bias.
If we had a perfect measure of the probability that a given worker was at
the firm at last contact, we could use this predictor as a regressor in the
1. These acronyms refer to the following programs: Targeted Jobs Tax Credit
(TJTC), Work Incentive Tax Credit (WIN) for recipients of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children, and the on-the-job training subsidies funded by the Com-
prehensive Employment Training Act (CETA-OJT).
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wage growth equation, thus relieving the parameter estimates of the condition
mentioned previously. We do not have such a measure, however, and if there
are unobservable characteristics of the worker or firm that influence both the
probability of still being at the firm and the wage growth of the worker, then
this probability will be correlated with the error term in the wage growth
equation, thus violating one of the more crucial assumptions of ordinary least
squares.
To circumvent the potential selection bias problem, we adapt a strategy
similar to that of Heckman (1979). Heckman shows that while using a censored
sample of workers still at the firm, the missing data problem can be reformu-
lated as a specification error resulting from the omission of an important
control variable, A, defined as
(1) A"
e(z)
1-0(z)
where e and 0 are respectively the density and distribution functions for
the standard normal variable z. Z is defined as -Bx where X is a vector of
independent variables and B are associated coeffiecient estimates from a first
stage probit model of the probability of having two wage observations.
Heckman's technique has the advantage of (1) allowing consistent estima-
tion using only workers with accurately measured wage growth and (2) taking
into account the possibility of unmeasured variables affecting both the selec-
tion equation (Is the worker still with the firm?) and the outcome equation
of interest (What has the worker's wage growth been?). As long as data are
available on all workers, regardless of current status, a first stage probit
can furnish -BX (and thus Z), needed to construct A.
Care must be taken, however, if the same set of independent variables is
used both in the probit and the wage growth regressions. It can be seen from
equation (1) that' A is simply an algebraic transformation of the predicted
p1;'obabilityof being at the firm, obtained in the probit procedure. This
probabili ty is in turn a function of the independent variables. Now, in
theory there is no identification problem in the system, since the probit
utilizes a different functional form than does the wage growth equation. In
practice, however, A often can be highly correlated with other explanatory
variables in the wage growth regression, resulting in problems of collinear-
ity, or in extreme cases, an ill-conditioned X-prime-X matrix.
2.0 Productivity Growth Results
In this section we analyze the determinants of productivity growth. Our
dependent variable is the change in the index of relative productivity multi-
plied by 100. The mean of the variable is 15.77 points for all workers and
19.86 for those who remain with the firm. The mean of the index of relative
productivity for those still at the firm at the time of the interview is 76.4
points.
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3.134 1.528
0.323 0.680
0.111 0.289
0.464 0.352
0.160 0.241
1.889 0.133
0.083 0.040
11.303 1.330
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TABLE 1
VARIABLE DEFINITIONSANDDESCRIPTIVESTATISTICS
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION~AN
STANLJAKLJ
DEV I ATI ON
Worker Characteristics
Education
Experience
Age
Age-Squared + 100
Male
Characteristics of Firm-Worker
Match
Relative Wage Ratio
Selection Investment
Training by Management
Training by Peers
Productivity 2nd Week
Productivity 2nd Week Inter-
acted with Log of Estab. Size
Productivity 2nd Week x
Proportion Unionized
Growth of Productivity
White-Collar Job
Subsidy Programs
TJTC
WIN
CETAlOJT
Employer Characteristics
Log Establishment Size
Log Establishment Size above 50
Proportion Unionized
Proportion White-Collar
proportion Craft
Market Characteristics
Log Market 'IIage
Change Market Employment
Log Market Size
12.029
43.340
27.497
859.311
0.483
0.620
6.260
20.103
14.426
0.564
1.734
0.057
0.202
0.478
0.014
0.011
0.063
1.689
67.330
10.161
722.548
0.499
0.263
23.280
25.448
23.089
0.221
1.071
0.162
0.165
0.499
0.120
0.107
0.244
Years of schoolIng when hired
Months of prior relevant job experience
Age when h Ired
Sex dummy; 1 = male, 0 = female
Current starting wage for this job divided by
average market wage In manufacturing for
1977-1979
Hours spent recruiting, screening, and Inter-
viewing applicants for the job
Hours spent orienting and training new employee
by management personnel In the first month
Hours spent orienting and training new employee
by nonmanagement personnel In the first month
Productivity level of employee at second week
of employment; ranges from 0 to 1
Productivity at 2nd week multiplied by log of
of firm size, December 1979
Productivity at 2nd week multlpl led by propor-
tion of workers unionized
Difference between current and Initial produc-
tivity
Equals I If white-collar job (as defined by .
census code); 0 otherwise
Equa Is 1 If
otherwise
Equa Is 1 If
otherwise
Equa Is 1 If
0 otherwise
employee Is eligible for TJTC: 0
employee Is eligible for WIN: 0
employee Is eligible for CETA/OJT;
Log of the number of employees at establishment
In December 1979
Log establishment size minus log 50 If employ-
ment Is GT 50; 0 If employment LT 50
Proportion of employees unionized
Proportion of employees In white-collar jobs
Proportion of employees In craft jobs
Log of average market wage In manufacturing,
from 1977-1979
Change In local labor market employment, 1977-
1979
Log of employment In local labor market
Table 2 presents the results of estimating our model on two different
samples. The first two models present the results when the full sample is
used. The full sample includes workers who left the firm before the survey
interview date, as well as workers who were still at the firm on the interview
date. The longer a worker is at the firm, the more effective that individual
is likely to become so the actual tenure at the time of the second measurement
of productivity is included as a control variable. Since, however, slow
learners are more likely to leave the firm and therefore have short tenure,
coefficients on the tenure variables may be biased. One way to avoid this
bias is to limit the sample to workers who have not left the firm. Models of
this type are subj ect to another type of bias: selection bias. Mechanisms
are available for correcting this bias, however. Model 3 corrects for selec-
tion bias by entering the inverse of the Mills ratio derived from a probit
model of job retention.
2.1 The Time Pattern of Productivity and Wage Growth
Medoff and Abraham (1981a, 1981b) have presented persuasive evidence that
in large firms the most senior employees are often somewhat less productive
than the less senior employees found in the same position. In the first year
or so of employment, however, the answers we obtained to questions about pro-
ductivity growth imply significant increases (15.77) over the course of the
first year. There is no contradiction between these two findings for they
refer to quite different segments of the tenure-productivity relationship.
Is there evidence in our data of a slowdown in the rate of productivity
growth as tenure increases? Yes, there is strong evidence of such a slow-
down. Because it controls for inputs of training time and productivity in
the second week, model 2 provides a better measure of the time pattern of
productivity growth than model 1. The coefficients on the tenure splines
imply that the productivity index rises at a rate of 1.05 points per month in
the first three months of employment, at a rate of 3.09 points per month in
the next three months, at a rate of .72 points per month in the next six
months, and at a rate of .36 points per month thereafter. The decline in the
rate of growth of the productivity index is statistically significant. If we
assume that the productivity index is a proportional transformation of true
productivity, percentage rates of increase may be calculated. They are 1.9
percent per month in the first three months, 5.4 percent per month in the next
thrt-e months, 1.1 percent per month in the next six months, and. 5 5 percent
per month thereafter. These rates of increase are quite substantial. Even
the rate of increase for the period after one year is impressive: 6.6 percent
per year.
As previously mentioned the coefficients on the tenure variables in model
2 are likely to be biased. Model 3 was estimated using data from stayers only
so it is not subject to potential simultaneous equation bias. The number of
observations having fewer than six months of tenure is too small to produce
stable estiates of tenure slopes during the first six months of employment,
however, so we will focus on the period after six months of employment. For
the period beyond six months, model 3 is a potentially useful check on our
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Worker Ch8racterlstlcs
Education LT 4 2.25 (.12) -11.82 ( .70) -18.58 ( .97)
Yrs of Education - .79 ( .35) - 2.10 (1 .00) - 2.94 (1 .24)
Yrs of Education GT 8 1.54 (.61) 3.39 (1 .42) 4.12 (1.55)
Yrs of EdUC8tlon GT 12 - .37 (.68) - 1.01 (2.00) .89 (1 .65)
Experience + 100 -2.89 (2.54) .42 ( .40) 1.72 (1.47)
Experience Squared + 10,000 .72 (2.06) .13 ( .42) .28 ( .77)
Age - .31 (1 .67) - .15 ( .86) - .04 ( .23)
Age Squared .003 (1 .27) .002 ( .68) .001 ( .31)
Male -1.29 (1 .96) - .77 (1.12) - 1.32 (1.75 )
CharacteristIcs of FIrm-Worker Match
SelectIon Investment .000 ( .05) .003 ( .20)
TraIning by Management .050 ( 4.66) .087 ( 7.2 I )
TraIning by Peers .025 ( 2.12) .039 ( 3.00)
Productivity Index 2nd Week - .32 (25.37) - .33 (17.94)
Subsidy Programs
TJTC 1.51 ( .60) - .43 ( .20) - .18 ( .08)
WiN -1.23 (.49) - 3.16 (I .37) - 3.91 (1 .40)
CETA-oJT 1.48 (1.59) - 2.10 (2.36) - 6.96 (3.10)
Employer Characteristics
Log EstabJ Ishment Size .87 (2.86) .85 (2.95) 2.30 (3.78)
Log Estab 11shment Size GT 50 .05 .( .06) - .70 (1 .01) - 1.77 (2.22)
Proportion UnIonized .75 ( .63) .97 ( .86) .24 ( .21)
ProportIon White Collar 4.41 (4.52) 1.43 (1 .51) 1.38 ( .96)
ProportIon Craft 2.67 (2.04) .38 ( .31) 1.38 ( .96)
Market CharacterIstIcs
Log Market Wage -1.05 (.47)
- 2.66 (1 .23) - 2.26 .96)
Change Market Employment - 2.21 ( .32) 5.39 .74)
Tenure VarIables
Actua I Tenure.. I 00 .003 ( .14) .035 ( 1.63) .041 ( .70)
Tenure GT 3 months + 100 .105 <3.23) .068 ( 2.23) - .097 ( 1 .30)
Tenure GT 6 months -+ 100 - .075 (4.48) - .079 ( 5.02) .059 ( 2.18)
Tenure GT 12 months + 100 - .016 (2.12) - .012 ( 1.70) .005 ( .65)
Lambda 17.01 (3.78)
Dummies for Industry X X X
Job Requirements X X
DummIes for Wage Rate X X X
R Square .120 .276 .350
TABlE 2
THE DETERMINANTS OF CHANGE IN THE PRODUCTIVITY INDEX
FuJ I Samp Ie
Modell Model 2
Stayers
Model 3
7
model 2 findings. The slopes are .12 percent per month for month six through
twelve and .30 percent per month (3.5 percent per year) thereafter. Neither
of these slopes are significantly different from zero so we cannot reject the
hypothesis that the slope is negative. The point estimates, however, suggest
that the point at which productivity starts declining with tenure has not been
reached in our data (166 of the 2,248 observations in the stayer sample have
two or more years of tenure.)
The growth rate of wage rates during these time intervals are rather sim-
ilar to these calculated productivity growth rates. Wage rates grew 0.36 per-
cent per month between the sixth and twelfth month and 0.49 percent per month
thereafter (see table 3). The data does not reject the hypothesis that the
growth rates of wages and productivity are the same in corresponding time
intervals. Some employers may have mistakenly reported the actual starting
wage for that individual rather than the current starting wage for the job.
If so, some observations are not adjusted for inflation of the scale wage and
these measures of the growth of the real wage are upward biased.
2.2 The Impact of Worker, Employer, and
Market Characteristics
Models 2 and 3 are structural models of the impacts of worker and employ-
er characteristics that control for the worker's productivity in the second
work week and the employer's training investments. Modell is a reduced form
that does not control for job requirements, initial productivity, and the
employer's training investments. The coefficients on worker and employer
attributes in this model capture both the direct effects and the indirect
effects that operate through initial productivity and employer investment
decisions.
In the structural models, experience and education have small, positive
effects on productivity growth that are generally not significant. The impact
of age is negative, small, and statistically insignificant. The size of the
establishment has a large, statistically significant impact upon productivity
growth. The change of the productivity index for a new employee at a fifty-
employee establishment is 7.4 points (2.7 points in model 2) greater than it
is at a two-employee establishment. The change of the productivity index at a
500 employee establishment is 1.22 points greater than it is at a 50 employee
establishment. None of the other characteristics of the employer or the
market have a large or statistically significant impact on the change of the
productivity index.
Training provided by the firm in the first month is associated with large
statistically significant increases in growth of the productivity index. Man-
agement provided training seems to be twice as effective as peer provided
training.
The reduced fom model also yields interesting results. New hires with
relevant previous experience generally have less to learn (have higher initial
8
TABLE :3
DETERM I NANTS OF WAGE ffiOWTH
Log Wage Log Wage Log STarTing
Growth Growth Wage
Worker Characteristics
Education LT4 -.48 (2.43) -.47 (2.41)
-.36 (I .35)
Years of Education -.054 ( 2.21) -.056 ( 2.27)
-.038 ( 1.14)
Years of Education GT 8 .076 ( 2.81) .80 (2.92) .071 ( 1.89)
Years of Education GT 12 -.018 ( 3.27) -.019 ( 3.39) -.011 ( 1.44)
Experience ~100 .024 ( 2.03) .025 ( 2.12) .111 ( 6.55)
Experience Squared + 10,000 -.004 ( 1.19) -.005 ( 1.30) -.021 ( 4.27)
Age + 10 .069 ( 3.64) .065 ( 3.40) .228 ( 8.21)
Age Squared. 100
-.010 ( 3.84) -.010 ( 3 .66) -.030 ( 7.61)
Male .063 ( 8.13) .063 ( 8.17) .164 (15.31)
Characteristics of Firm Worker Match
Selection Investment + 100 -.011 ( .71)
Training by Management + 100 .031 ( 2.49)
Training by Peers + 100 -.001 ( .08)
productivity 2nd Week .123 ( 3.19)
Change In Productivity Index .173 ( 4.53)
Size x Latest Productivity -.020 ( 1.99)
Size x Productivity 2nd Week
Log Starting Wage
Subsidy Programs
TJTC
WIN
CETA-oJT
-.133 <10.58)
.004
(
.05)
.016 ( .56)
- .010
(
.41)
Employer Characteristics
Log EstablIshment SIze
Log EstablIshment SIze GT 50
ProportIon UnIonIzed
ProportIon WhIte Collar
ProportIon Craft
.026
.008
-.004
.027
.088
( 2.47)
( 1.02)
(
.38)
( 2.48)
( 5.91)
Market Characteristics
Log Market Wage
Change Market Employment
.070 ( 2.91)
.205
( 2.75)
Tenure Variables
Tenure + 100
Tenure ET 6 me + 100
Tenure GT 12 me ~ 100
Lambda
.020 ( 1.00)
-.008 ( .38)
.004 ( .57)
.055 ( 1.14)
Dummies for Industry
Job Requirements
R Square
x
X
.179
.056 ( 1.62)
-.016 ( 1.76)
-.130 <10.41)
-.003 (
.008 (
.006 (
.14)
.61>
.25)
-.021 ( .54)
.024 ( .03)
-.022 ( 1.54)
.018
-.008
.251
.108
.090
( 4.03)
(
.72)
<14.44
)
( 7.20)
( 4.46)
.017
( 1.95)
-.005
(
.67>
-.005
(
.43)
.025
( 2.26)
.087 ( 5.83)
.071
( 2.95)
.210
( 2.80)
.027
-.012
.002
.031
X
( 1.37>
(
.56)
(
.33)
(
.69)
.240 ( 7.02)
.352 ( 3.25)
X
X
.453
9
X
.165
productivity) and require less employer investment. As a result the coeffi-
cient on experience that is positive in the structural models becomes negative
and statistically significant in the reduced form model.
The reduced form model also implies that new hires at firms with high
proportions of white-collar jobs and high proportions of craft jobs experience
higher rates of productivity growth. None of the characteristics of the local
labor market have a statistically significant effect on the change in our in-
dex of productivity.
3.0 Wage Growth
In this section we examine the determinants of the wage increases that
new employees receive in the first year or so of their tenure at a firm. Our
dependent variable, the logarithm of wage growth, has a mean of .118 and a
standard deviation of .15. The models of growth that we will be analyzing are
estimated using data on workers who were still at the firm at the time of our
employer survey. The restricted nature of the sample implies that these mod-
els may be subject to selection bias. The procedure that was adopted for cor-
recting this potential selection bias problem is described in section 1.2.
The subsections that follow present the empirical findings. The impact of the
measured productivity of the worker on the wage increases received is examined
in section 3.1. The impact of other characteristics of the worker is dis-
cussed in section 3.2. The impacts of the employer's characteristics and the
pressure of demand in the local labor market are presented in sections 3.3 and
3.4.
3.1 Impacts of the Employee's Productivity
The most important finding of this paper is the positive and significant
impact of our index of productivity in the second week and the growth of the
productivity index on the wage increases received by an employee (see table
3). Holding the growth of the productivity index constant, a one standard
deviation increase in the index of productivity in the second week (an in-
crease of .22 units) is associated with a 2.7 percent higher wage increase in
firms with only one employee. Holding initial productivity constant, a similar
increase in productivity growth is associated with a 4.0 percent higher wage
increase in firms with only one employee. The interaction between the index
of current productivity and firm size has a statistically significant negative
impact on wage growth. This implies that the responsiveness of wage growth to
the individual worker's relative productivity is greatest in small firms. The
impact of a one standard deviation change in initial productivity on wage
growth is 2.8 percent in a one-employee establishment, 1.0 percent in an es-
tablishment with 50 employees and zero in an establishment with 500 employees.
The impact of a similar change in the index of productivity growth on wage
growth is 4.0 percent in establishments with only one employee, 2.2 percent in
establishments with 50 employees, and 1.1 percent in establishments with 500
employees.
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Some simple models of wage setting predict ,that the individual's wage
should be varied in proportion to his or her relative productivity. Our data
suggest that this prediction does not square with reality. If we assume that
the index of relative productivity is a proportional transformation of true
relative productivity, the elasticity of the individual's current wage rate
with respect to that person's true productivity implied the coefficients in
model 1 is between .09 and .13 in the smallest establishments and correspond-
ingly lower in larger establishments. If our productivity index is a more
than proportionate transformation of true productivity (so that it exaggerates
the proportionate size of productivity differentials between people and over
time), or if the variance of measurement error is large relative to the
variance of true productivity, .09 and .13 are downward biased estimates of
the true underlying elasticity of current relative wage with respect to
current relative productivity in very small firms. It seems unlikely, how-
ever, that correcting for these measurement problems would raise the estimate
of the true elasticity in very small firms to unity. Even if the smallest
firms had a relative wage-relative productivity elasticity of one, large firms
would definitely have lower elasticities.
There are a number of plausible explanations for an elasticity of the
relative wage with respect to true relative productivity of less than one.
First, productivity differentials between workers at a firm might reflect
differences in skills that are highly specific to the firm. If the worker is
not able to translate high productivity at the current employer into a higher
wage offer at another firm, the competitive pressure on the current employer
to raise the individual's wage is reduced.
Second, even if all productivity differentials within the firm reflected
differences in generalized competence, it is very difficult for other employ-
ers to measure these differentials accurately and thus base wage and job
offers on them. Self-reports of one's productivity are necessarily treated
with skepticism. If the worker is currently employed or on temporary layoff,
the individual's employer has a positive incentive to speak very positively
about the workers he wants to get rid of and negatively about the workers he
wants to keep. The threat of legal action by ex-employees has caused many
employers to establish a policy of handing out no information at all.
The third explanation is the high cost of accurately measuring a partic-
ular worker's productivity. In most jobs, objective indicators of produc-
tivity simply do not exist. This is why in November 1975, only 1.2 percent of
the nation's workers were paid on a piece rate basis and only 1.9 percent on a
pure commission basis (Flaim1976). In most work environments productivity-
based wage setting would have to use subjective evaluations by immediate
supervisors. Top managements of large organizations legitimately fear that
some line supervisors may abuse the power this kind of wage setting gives
them. If a union represents the workers, the ability and inclination of
management to adjust wages to productivity is reduced even further. As a
result, large organizations greatly restrict the range over which wage rates
may be varied. A supervisor's perception of a 50 percent productivity differ-
ential may translate into only a 1 or 2 percentage point differential in the
wage increase that is awarded. Supervisors may also misperceive the criteria
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they are supposed to use. While we cannot prove it from our data, it is our
view that it is the threat of unionization and the difficulty of insuring that
supervisors will carry out instructions correctly that are responsible for the
very weak connection between relative productivity and relative wage rates in
large establishments. In small owner-managed firms, unions are not as much of
a threat and the owner makes the decision about the wage to offer. Even if
one trusted supervisors to be as fair as possible and employees believed the
system was fair, supervisory ratings would not be perfectly correlated with
true productivity. Optimal wage setting in such an environment would take
into account the measurement error, and the elasticity of the wage rate with
respect to measured productivity would be less than one.
The fourth reason for an elasticity below one is random month-to-month or
year-to-year variations in productivity. Actual productivity will not be per-
fectly autocorrelated , so current productivity is an imperfect predictor of
next period's productivity. If next period's wages are set equal to next
period's expected productivity, the elasticity of the wage with respect to
this period's productivity will be less than one.
3.3 The Impact of Workers' Qualifications
Education, experience, age, and being a male all have positive statisti-
cally significant effects upon both the level of the starting wage and the
rate at which it grows in the first year or so of employment. Controlling for
the characteristics of the job, the firm and the reported productivity of the
worker reduces but does not eliminate the effects of these characteristics on
wage growth.
The small size of the coefficients on our direct measures of productivity
leaves room for these proxies for productivity--education, experience, and
age-to have direct impacts on wage growth.1 Our analysis of the determi-
nants of productivity growth showed that both education and experience had
small positive impacts on wage growth. How consistent are the coefficients on
these productivity proxies in the wage growth equation with the corresponding
coefficients in the productivity growth equation? A comparison can be made if
we make an assumption about the scaling of the productivity index. Assuming
that it is a proportional transformation of true productivity and a multi-
plicative error, the change in productivity growth divided by the mean level
of productivity is a meas~re of percentage changes in productivity. In model
3 the change produced by a year of high school is 1.6 percent, by a year of
college is 2.7 percent, by four rather than zero years of relevant experience
is 1 percent, by being thirty rather than twenty years old is almost zero (.04
percent). The comparable coefficients in the model 1 wage equation are 2.2
percent for high school, 0.04 percent for college, 1.1 percent for four years
of relevant experience, and 1.8 percent for being thirty rather than twenty.
The effects of experience on the two outcomes were almost identical. The
education coefficients seem similar and are not statistically different from
each other.
The effect of age is, however, completely different in the two equations.
Older workers are not growing more productive any faster than young workers
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and are not reported to be any more productive at the time of the interview,
but they do get considerably larger wage increases and have higher starting
wage rates as well. The hypothesis that age coefficients in the wage and
productivity growth equations are the same, is rejected by the data (t= 2.43
assuming that the error variances of the two equations are uncorrelated). Sex
also has dramatically different effects in the two equations. Men get a 6.3
percent greater wage increase than women but they seem to learn less quickly
and their index of relative productivity is about 3 percent lower than women
at the time of the interview.2 The difference between the coefficients in
the two equations is statistically significant (t = 6.37,assuming that error
variances of the two equations are uncorrelated).
How much confidence can be placed in these findings? Our results depend
upon potentially controversial assumptions about the validity and scaling of
the index of relative productivity and on having successfully controlled for
the characteristics of the job. The jobs that men and women get are generally
quite different and our measures of job requirements may not have controlled
for all these differences. Therefore, we do not view our findings as conclu-
sive. They need to be checked in other data sets. Our findings about the
effects of age are quite consistent with Hedoff and Abraham's (1981a) find-
ings. Our age-at-time-of-hiring variable corresponds closely to their years-
of-precompany-experience variable. In all of the data sets they examined,
they found that when grade level of the job is held constant, additional years
of precompany experience were associated with significantly lower performance
ratings and with significantly higher wage rates (p. 200, 201). Thus we feel
there is good evidence that part of the tendency of wage rates to rise with
age cannot be justified by a corresponding rise of productivity with age. In
our data, age is rewarded with higher wage rates even when it is not associ-
ated with additional, previous, useful work experience. Additional years of
previous, useful job experience are associated with being more productive, but
controlling for this experience, age has almost no independent effect on the
level of productivity and a negative effect on its rate of change. We have
not been able to find any studies that have compared wage and productivity
growth of males and females in the same job. More research is required before
it can be established whether the effects that seem to be associated with the
a job occupant's sex are truly an effect of sex or are actually an effect of
the job (i.e., Do male typists and female construction workers receive
different wage rates and promotions than others in their occupation?).
One possible explanation for this pattern may be that older workers and
males have more attractive alternative opportunities, so competitive pressure
to raise their wages is greater than it is for women and for young workers.
Other possible explanations are that (a) men and older workers typically
receive training that is more general, (b) their training is completed while
the training of women and younger workers is continuing and will result in a
catch-up wage increase in the near future, or (c) some firms display a taste
for discriminating against women and young workers.
The receipt of a subsidy has no observable impact upon the rate of wage
increase. The time that personnel and supervisory staff spend training the
individual does seem' to be associated with higher rates of wage increase.
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Twenty extra hours of management training time increase wage growth by 0.62
percent, and the effect is significantly different from zero. Wage increases
are not, however, affected by the amount of time that coworkers spend training
the new employee. The tendency to reward management training time more than
coworker training time is consistent with our earlier finding (in section 2.1)
that management training time has a larger per hour impact on productivity
growth than coworker training time. While the differences between the coeffi-
cients in the wage growth equations are larger, the data would not reject a
hypothesis that the ratio of the coefficients in the productivity growth equa-
tion is equal to their ratio in the wage growth equation. Another possible
explanation of the finding is that managers (the people who set wage scales
and make promotion decisions) are more aware of the training that they and
their staff provide and, therefore, tend to reward it more than the training
provided by coworkers.
3.3 Impacts of Employer Characteristics
The size of the establishment has a large statistically significant ef-
fect on the rate at which wage rates increase. Establishments with only two
employees typically offer wage increases that are 8.5 percent smaller than
establishments with 50 employees. Establishments with 500 employees
- typi-
cally offer wage increases that are 4.2 percent higher than establishments
with 50 employees. Here again coefficients on establishment size in the pro-
ductivity growth equations are similar. Making the standard assumptions about
the scaling of the productivity index, the productivity growth at establish-
ments with two employees was 9.7 percent lower than the productivity growth at
establishments with 50 employees. Productivity growth at establishments with
500 employees was 1.3 percent higher.
The proportion of the establishment's work force in white-collar occupa-
tions and the proportion in craft occupations both had large statistically
significant impacts on wage growth. A two standard deviation increase in the
proportion in white-collar occupations (a change of .70) raises the starting
wage rate by 7.5 percent and the rate of wage growth by 1.9 percent. A two
standard deviation increase in the proportion in craft occupations (a change
of .48) raises the starting wage by 4.3 percent and the rate of wage growth by
4.2 percent. Unionization has no effect on the rate of wage growth but does
have a large impact on the level of starting wages. Holding the characteris-
tics o~ the job and the worker constant, starting wage rates at a unionized
firm are typically 25 percent higher than those at a nonunion firm.
3.4 Impacts of Market Characteristics
Indicators of the availability and attractiveness of alternative job
opportunities in the local labor market had large positive and significant
effects on wage growth and on the level of the starting wage. A 10 percent
higher local manufacturing wage was associated in our data with a 2.4 percent
higher starting wage and a .7 percent larger wage increase. Workers in tight
labor markets also get higher wage rates. The best measure of demand pressure
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in a labor market is the rate of growth of employment in that labor market.
In labor markets with yearly growth rates of employment that are 4.1 percent
greater than average (a change of two standard deviations), entry-level jobs
typically pay 2.9 percent more and early wage increases are 1.7 percent
higher.
CONCLUSION
This study has examined the effect of on-the-job training on the growth
of reported productivity and wage rates. The data that is analyzed has been
obtained from interviews with a sample of over 3500 employers geographically
dispersed around the nation. The examination of the determinants of the
growth of reported productivity yielded some very important findings. When
initial productivity and training investments are controlled for in a struc-
tural model of the learning process, education, previous useful experience,
and being female were associated with somewhat higher rates of productivity
growth. These results suggest that the rate at which a new job is learned is
greatest for women, for more educated workers, and for workers with signifi-
cant amounts of previous useful job experience. Being younger is not associ-
iated with being a faster learner. The only characteristic of the employer
that had a statistically significant effect on the rate of learning was
establishment size.
Models of wage growth were estimated that contained measures of reported
productivity in the second week and changes in reported productivity. Wage
rates were found to respond to the individual's reported productivity in small
establishments but not in large establishments. The elasticity of this res-
ponse is low, however, under .15. The weakness of the tendency of wage rates
to reflect reported individual productivity has a number of causes: errors
in measurement, the high costs of measuring productivity, random year-to-year
variations in true productivity, and the fact that variations in productivity
not visible to other firms need not be fully compensated.
Education, experience, age, and being male all have positive statis-
tically significant effects on both the level of the starting wage and the
rate at which it grows in the first year or so of employment. The positive
effects of age and maleness on wage growth contrast sharply with their lack of
impact on productivity growth. Firm characteristics that have a statistically
significant positive impact on w~ge growth are size, proportion of white-
collar workers, and proportion of craftworkers. The rate of growth of
employment in the local labor market and level of the local manufacturing wage
also had positive and significant effects on both the level and the rate of
growth of wage rates. Participation in a subsidy program had no impact on
either the wage level or its rate of growth.
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NOTES
1. If there is no measurement error in our productivity index and if the true
elasticity of relative wages with respect to relative productivity is It the
productivity index should explain much of the within-firm variation of rela-
tive wages, and the coefficients on variables such as education, experience,
and age should be close to zero.
2. Most men and women work in occupationally segregated jobs, so the referent
for our index of relative productivity is generally going to be other workers
of 'the same sex. Under these circumstances it is not clear what a correlation
between sex and the level of the index of relative productivity means.
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